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I. INTRODUCTION
We can . .. define procedure in a common sense manner. Procedural law
may contain its own independent values, but it also serves as an
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2010; B.A.,
History, University of California Santa Cruz. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Main for his invaluable
assistance on this Cmment. I would also like to thank Professors Wenyan Luo and Mao Xiaoxiao for providing
me with an essential perspective on the Chinese legal system. Lastly, I would like to thank my friends and
family, without which this would not have been possible.
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instrument for guaranteeing the observance of substantive law, or, in the
event that the substantive law has been breached, as a means through
which an injured party may obtain relief. Procedural law therefore is
necessarily interdependent with substantive law, and neither is of much
value without the other.'
As the above quote eloquently illustrates, procedural law is inherently
intermingled with substantive law, and in order to understand the practical
significance of procedural law, it is best to discuss it in relation to its practical
effect on substantive law. Civil procedure represents the instruments and tools
available to a potential litigant to have their substantive rights protected in the
civil courts. If a civil procedure system confronts potential litigants with
significant hurdles that must be overcome before the merits of the case may even
be heard, it is likely that many litigants may decide not to bring the case at all.
As one noted scholar on civil procedure put it, "procedures can, in a very
practical sense, negate, resuscitate, or generate substantive rights."2 Yet, if one
views procedural rules in isolation of the substantive law, it can be very difficult
to see their significant practical effect. In recognition of this problem, this
comment will illustrate the practical consequences of the procedural issues
involved here by a discussion of a hypothetical case. This case, the details of
which will follow, will provide the reader with a lens to examine the procedural
issues mentioned here in a more realistic light.
Even with this perspective, any discussion of procedural law would be
limited if it focused only on a single country. Procedure is a reflection of
important political and ideological battles, and to view it in isolation of a single
country would ignore the importance that culture and history have in any system
of civil procedure.' Accordingly, this comment will examine how procedural law
would affect a hypothetical case in a common law system (the United States), a
civil law system (France), and a socialist system (The People's Republic of
China). Since each system emerged out of a unique historical and political
context, this comment will also briefly address the historical background of each
country.
1. Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant G. Garth, Chapter 1: Introduction - Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil
Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: VOLUME XVI CIVIL PROCEDURE 14
(Mauro Cappelletti Ed., 1987).
2. THOMAS 0. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2006).
3. See id. (discussing the notion that mastery of civil procedure requires an understanding of global
issues).
4. See Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., "Court-Performed" Mediation in the People's Republic of China: A
Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts' Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 391, 414 (2000) (arguing that culture and history play an important role in the development of
civil procedure); see also Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 277, 278 (2002); see generally OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS
IN A CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005).
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In order to gain a full and complete perspective on a given civil procedure
system it would be ideal to study all aspects, from pre-filing to appeals. Due to
practical time and space limitations, this comment will only address procedural
obstacles that affect the pre-filing stage. These obstacles include the total cost of
litigation, both attorney fees and fees to the court, in addition to any possible
relief for litigants who are unable to afford those costs. Even assuming that a
litigant may be able to afford these fees, the next question is the amount of
preparation, in the form of factual allegations or evidence, the litigant must
undergo before they can proceed with their claim. If the potential cost of
litigation is simply too high, or too burdensome, the next issue is whether there
are any alternatives, or informal, alternative dispute resolution systems that the
litigant can use to seek relief. Although this approach focuses on a narrow
segment of a system of civil procedure, the topics illustrate well the interaction of
procedural and substantive law in a variety of important contexts.
II. DESCRIPTION OF HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A stylized case will be used to examine pre-filing obstacles in all three
jurisdictions. This case involves a small business owner named Jane Doe. She
formed a contract with a construction company to build an addition to her
business premises. The job was completed but Ms. Doe claims it was performed
inadequately and would like to recover damages from the contractor. This
comment will trace several reasons why she may decide not to file a formal
action. The matter in controversy would be an amount large enough to escape
small claims courts, but not something so extraordinary that it would make or
break Ms. Doe's business.
One potential weakness in this survey is that procedural law would likely be
only one of the many reasons that Ms. Doe would choose not to file her case.
Other potential reasons could relate to the merits of her potential case, the
particular nuances of the substantive law, and simple personal reasons that are
not easily categorized.! However, an examination of the procedural obstacles that
may confront Ms. Doe in her pursuit for relief offers a perspective on how the
courts, as a system, may look to potential litigants. As such, the nuances of the
substantive law in question, although important, are not addressed in this
comment.
189
5. See Shawn J. Bayern, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1697
(2005) (arguing that the vast majority of injuries experienced go uncompensated, and explaining the reasons
why people choose not to file a lawsuit).
2010 / Threshold Obstacles to Justice
III. UNITED STATES
A. Historical Context
The roots of United States civil procedure law can be found in the English
6procedural system. At the time of the founding of the United States, the English
court system was split between two types of courts: common law courts, and
courts of equity.! Under the common law system, potential litigants were not able
to have their cases heard unless their case fit within the technical requirements of
a writ.' A writ was a royal order, issued by the Chancellor, that stated this type
of case could be heard, but its requirements were highly technical and did not
encompass all possible forms of relief.'o Even if a litigant did manage to fit his
case within the writ requirements, there were various other procedural obstacles
facing him that could lead to his case being dismissed." In response to criticism
about the harsh effects of this system, the Chancellor would decide to hear cases
where there was no relief at common law, but he believed that it would be unfair
to allow the common law in this case.1 Proceedings in equity court reflected this
concern that fairness to the parties and the system was more important than strict
adherence to procedural rules.
Although the United States declared independence from Great Britain in
1776, the newly found nation still chose to adopt basic features of the courts of
law and equity.14 However, in 1848 a new procedure code called the Field Code
developed in New York that merged law and equity into a single system. 6 The
Field Code, modeled largely after the procedure of the equity courts, introduced
trans-substantive rules, loosened restrictions on the joinder of claims and parties,
and liberalized other stringent requirements. '7 Despite this move towards
flexibility, the Field Code still retained some of the restrictive aspects of common
law procedure.'" Although the Field Code was first introduced in New York, it
would soon be adopted by many other states.
6. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 914 (1987).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 915.
9. Id. (Chancellor "served as the king's secretary, adviser, and agent").
10. See id. at 915-917.
11. See id. at 915-918.
12. See id. at 918.
13. See id. at 919-921.
14. Id. at 928.
15. See id. at 932 (Field Code was named after its principle supporter, David Dudley Field).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 933-934.
18. E.g., id. at 939.
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The debates that surrounded the Field Code, as well as the English adoption
of a simplistic procedural system, helped fuel a movement for even more flexible
procedures.' 9 Proponents of a more flexible system argued that a restrictive
procedure was prone to abuse by dishonest parties, and led to otherwise
meritorious cases losing on technicalities. 2 Eventually, the proponents of a more
flexible system prevailed. 2' The Rules Enabling Act, passed in 1934, allowed for
the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was drafted and
accepted into law by 1938.22 The essential point of the Federal Rules was that
"procedure should step aside and not interfere with substance."2 ' As such, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is similar to equity courts in that they are
designed to be flexible in their application.24
B. Legal Costs and Legal Aid
The American procedural system attempts to provide perfect justice; yet, in
its "search for perfect and complete justice. . .[it has led] to excesses of time and
expense that society cannot or will not afford." 25 Since many American lawyers
bill by the hour, there is the concern that litigators may be excessively thorough
just so they can bill as many hours as possible.26 Yet, there is some indication that
the high cost of litigation may be exaggerated. 27 The high cost of prolonged
litigation encourages parties to settle a case quickly, even if they are not
necessarily in the wrong, rather than risk a long and costly trial.2 1 This situation
may be exacerbated by the so-called American Rule regarding attorney fees.29
Unlike most countries, the United States follows the American Rule that requires
each party to bear their own litigation expenses, except for certain exceptions.o
Proponents of the American Rule argue that, if the loser were required to pay for
19. Id. at 942-943; Roscoe Pound, Address at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association: The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Aug. 26, 1906), in 29
A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (1906), available at http://www.law.du.edu/sterling/Content/ALH/pound.pdf (in this
famous speech Pound criticizes what he describes as the "sporting theory of justice" as being inequitable and
unfair).
20. Subrin, supra note 6, at 945, 947.
21. Id. at 973.
22. Id. at 970, 973.
23. Id. at 973; see also F.R.C.P. 1.
24. Id. at 973-74.
25. Richard L. Marcus, Malaise of the Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 71, 92 (Adrian
A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) (quoting Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound
Procedural System: the Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1997)).
26. Marcus, supra note 25, at 92.
27. Id. at 92-93.
28. See id. at 93.
29. Id.
30. Elaine W. Shoben, Let the Damages Fit the Wrong: An Immodest Proposal for Reforming Personal
Injury Damages, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1069, 1075-76 (2006) (some of these exceptions are provided by statute, or
contract, while others are more based on equitable principles like if a party is acting in bad faith).
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the winner's cost this would discourage legitimate claims from being filed." On
the other hand, opponents of the American Rule point out that the rule has
encouraged litigation because there are limited consequences for a party that files
an unmeritorious suit.32
For those unable to afford an attorney, legal aid may be available. However,
these services have not been sufficient to meet the demand for legal aid in
America.3 Up until 1974, the only legal aid available in the United States was
through scattered private organizations which primarily serviced urban areas." In
recognition of the lack of adequate coverage, in 1974 the United States
government created the Legal Services Corporation (hereinafter "LSC"), an
independent corporation supported by government funds, to provide a centralized
system of legal aid." The mission of the LSC was to provide minimum access36 to
legal services in every county in the United States." However, the LSC only
received funding at the minimum access level, with the notion that state, local,
and private resources would begin to develop. Since then, the LSC has faced a
growing number of people eligible for free legal aid, but no corresponding
increase in funding.
Due to the inadequate funding, for every one person served, LSC currently
turns away at least one eligible person seeking aid.40 This has resulted in the legal
aid system (including private attorneys) only being able to meet a small amount
of the yearly legal needs of lower and middle income people. 4' Even if an
individual is aware of the need for legal assistance, it may be difficult for him to
find a legal aid attorney in his area.42 Generally, there is only one legal aid
attorney per 6,861 low-income people, while there is only one general
practitioner for every 525 people in the general population. 43 As such, even
though the need for legal services for lower-income people matches that of the
general population, the availability of legal services is far below that of the
general population."
31. Id. at 1076.
32. Id.
33. See Legal Services Corporation, Documenting the Justice Gap In America, 14 (2nd ed. 2007),
available at http://www.1sc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 1-2.
36. Id. at I & n.1 ("Minimum access was defined as two lawyers, with appropriate support, per 10,000
low-income people.").
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 9-13 (estimating that the average lower income household experiences legal needs ranging up
to more than three per year, but fewer than one in five are addressed).
42. See id. at 15.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 17.
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Moreover, even when legal aid is available many people with serious legal
concerns do not use these services. One reason this happens is that people with
legal problems are not aware that there may be a legal solution to their problem.
Even if individuals are aware that their problem has a legal solution they may not
be aware that legal aid is available. In short, many people are not informed about
the legal system and how to best utilize it. That type of problem can be fixed by
educating people on legal issues.45
Those who do not qualify for LSC programs, may still be able to find
assistance at one of the many privately run legal aid clinics in the United States.
These include clinics run by prominent law schools which provide law students
an opportunity to get practical experience while helping those who would not
otherwise be able to afford legal representation.4 Many private attorneys also
provide their services pro bono through clinics or through private connections.
Although the ABA has never required that attorneys provide pro bono services, it
strongly encourages it.41 Unfortunately, very few private attorneys volunteer their
* 48services pro bono.
Although the private sector has attempted to meet the need for legal
representation through pro bono services and legal aid clinics, the resources
available are not nearly comprehensive enough. Without a more comprehensive
structure, the legal needs of many lower income people will continue to be
unfulfilled and without effective assistance of counsel it is highly likely that
many will continue to have no meaningful access to the justice system.
Those who either could not otherwise afford an attorney or are not eligible
for legal aid may still be able to find some relief via the contingency fee system.
A contingency fee contract is an arrangement where a lawyer agrees to take a
case, but does not charge the client any fee up front.49 If the client loses his case,
the lawyer simply takes nothing."o However, if the client wins his case, the lawyer
takes a percentage of the eventual award (usually one-third).5' This system is
45. Id. at 13-14. For an example of an organization that strives to provide this type of legal education to
the general population see Street Law Inc., Who We Are, http://www.streetlaw.org/en/Page.WhoWeAre.aspx
(last visited Mar. 6, 2010). Several law schools have also launched projects to educate the public on its legal
rights. For example, at the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Prof. Fred Galvez teaches a course
in "street law" that is focused on using law students to teach practical legal knowledge to high school students.
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Street Law International, http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Civic
Legal-and-PublicAgencies/EducationPipelineInitiative/StreetLawInternational.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2010.)
46. For an overview of the history of clinical legal education in America see generally J.P. "Sandy"
Ogilvy, Celebrating CLEPR's 40th Anniversary: The Early Development of Clinical Legal Education and Legal
Ethics Instruction in U.S. Law Schools, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2009).
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
48. See generally David D. Dreyer, Culture, Structure, and Pro-Bono Practice, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 185,
197-99 (2009) (fewer than 10% of lawyers accept pro bono referrals, furthermore, only about 10 to 20% of
American attorneys practice pro bono.).
49. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 258 (2008).
50. Id.
51. Id.; JULIE A. DAVIES & PAUL. T. HAYDEN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAW 10 (2008).
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generally only available in personal injury cases." Many foreign countries
strongly criticize the United States' use of contingency fees because it is thought
they improperly give the attorney a personal stake in the outcome of the action.
On the other hand, proponents of contingency fees argue that it provides people
who could not otherwise afford it access to the courthouse. N
As one can see, Ms. Doe may face serious obstacles to finding an attorney.
The high cost of the attorney's fee may be prohibitive for a claim with a value
only slightly above small claims court. Ms. Doe could try to get assistance from
the Legal Services Corporation, or from one of the many pro bono projects in the
United States. Yet, as the information above makes clear, legal aid is not widely
available, and the legal services corporation may be unable to assist her. Nor is it
likely that Ms. Doe could take advantage of the contingency fee system because
her claim is not based on personal injury, nor is it likely to yield enough money
to be attractive to an attorney on a contingency fee basis. Faced with this
situation, Ms. Doe's only option may be to represent herself pro se." Yet,
proceeding pro se would present significant problems for her since she has no
formal legal training and this would make it less likely that she would prevail on
her claim. 6 Many, if not all, courts do not allow corporations to represent
themselves. As such, if her business is incorporated, even the option to proceed
pro se may be foreclosed to her.
C. Pleading Standard
At the outset it is important to note that any potential litigant would have a
choice between two basic types of courts: state and federal." Each state has the
power to create local courts of various types, and set the rules and procedure that
will govern in those courts. 9 Generally, state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, which means they can hear practically all types of claims. 0 In
contrast, the rules and procedures of federal courts are governed by federal law,
regardless of what state the federal court is located in.6 ' Federal courts are courts
52. See Marcus, supra note 25, at 94.
53. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark?,
37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 39-48 (1989).
54. Id. at 43-44.
55. See 9 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 22:607 (2008) (briefly summarizing where the right to proceed pro se
originates).
56. See generally Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness
in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
305 (2002); but see 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pleading § 102 (2008) (courts will generally construe complaints written
by pro se litigants more liberally).
57. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1875 (2008).
58. Marcus, supra note 25, at 73-74.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The federal court system is composed of twelve circuits, that are each responsible for a given
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of limited jurisdiction, and generally can only hear claims arising out of federal
law, or between citizens of different states (A.K.A. "diversity jurisdiction").62
With the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress had
hoped that states would follow Congress' lead and adopt the Federal Rules for
63their own courts. Yet, fewer than half of the states have chosen to formally
adopt the federal rules into their state court systems or even replicate a
substantial portion." Notwithstanding this lack of textual uniformity, some
scholars have argued that even though the state courts do not expressly adopt the
federal rules, practically speaking many state courts operate in accordance with
the federal rules.6' As such, this comment will proceed with the assumption of
treating the federal rules as controlling, even though practically speaking Ms.
Doe may litigate in a state court with widely different rules.
One of the most notable, and controversial, aspects of United States civil
procedure is the liberal pleading standard that allows litigants latitude in
initiating a case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require simply a, "short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."66
This standard is known as notice pleading and is intended to provide the
defendant with, "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds on
which it rests."67 For many years, this standard was so liberal that it was said a
case would not be dismissed unless, "it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff
[could] prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."6
Recently, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly held that the
"no set of facts" language in Conley v. Gibson, cannot be, and never truly has
been, taken literally.69 If Conley was read literally then a, "wholly conclusory
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 'set of
[undisclosed] facts' to support recovery."o As such, the proper pleading standard
requires the plaintiff to merely demonstrate that his claim is plausible, and not
just conceivable." However, once a claim has been adequately stated, then it,
"may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
geographical area. Within each circuit, there are multiple district court and magistrate courts that hear cases.
The highest court in the federal court system is the Supreme Court. Id.
62. Id. at 74.
63. Thomas 0. Main, "An Overwhelming Question" About Non-Formal Procedure, 3 NEV. L.J. 388,
391 (2003).
64. Id.
65. See Id. at 392-395.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
67. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).
68. Id. at 45-46.
69. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007).
70. Id.at561.
7 1. Id. at 570.
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the complaint."7 At first, many were confused if Twombly applied only to its
unique factual circumstances (notably antitrust litigation). However, in 2009 the
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal et al. resolved any remaining doubt when it
held that the Twombly plausibility standard applies to all type of claims." It is
unclear how much, if at all, the Twombly decision raised the pleading standard.74
One indication that has not been raised is that two weeks after the decision in
Twombly the Supreme Court cited Twombly as support for the proposition that
notice pleading is still the standard." The plausibility standard set by Twombly is
certainly higher than the very low bar established by Conley; however, it does not
appear that the standard has been raised to a particularly burdensome level.
Consequently, when preparing her complaint, all Ms. Doe would be required
to do is prepare a brief complaint that puts the other party on notice of the claim
against them. At this stage, she would not be obligated to put forth concrete
evidence to support her complaint, so long as she provides factual allegations that
are at least plausible. With this liberal standard, her complaint could be as short
as three paragraphs: one paragraph stating jurisdictional requirements, one
paragraph briefly stating the incident in question, and finally one paragraph
stating how she was harmed by this incident. However, the liberal nature of this
pleading standard would impose only a modest burden on Ms. Doe at this point
in her case.
D. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Although Ms. Doe may not be able to find relief in the traditional justice
system because of cost issues, she may be able to take advantage of one of the
many alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems currently used today. The
United States, arguably more so than any other country, has long relied on
litigation to resolve disputes. 78 The legal system, and the rule of law, are sources
of American pride, and play a prominent role in American society." However,
the increasing reliance on litigation to resolve disputes placed a heavy burden on
the court system, and left courts wondering how to alleviate this burden.so One
solution was proposed by Professor Frank Sander of Harvard Law School in a
1976 conference. Sander argued for the creation of multiple types of dispute
72. Id. at 563.
73. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-1954 (2009).
74. Andree Sophia Blumstein, A Higher Standard, 43 TENN. B.J. 12-15 (2007).
75. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11.
77. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is
Reshaping our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165-67 (2003).
78. Colatrella, supra note 4, at 391-92.
79. See ld. at 391, 414.
80. See Id. at 391-92.
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resolution systems, and to allow litigants the opportunity to choose the one that
best fit their needs.8'
One of the earliest forms of ADR was community justice centers that were
created during the 1960's-1970's in response to a growing concern that
traditional formal adjudication was elitist and unresponsive to the needs of the
populace.82 Community justice centers introduced a mediation based approach
that left the power to decide the dispute in the disputants' hands, rather than in
the hands of a third party. Over time, community justice centers sought to
develop relationships with the local court system, and courts tended to refer
minor cases to them." Although community justice centers were mostly a
temporary phenomenon, their effectiveness gave courts a sense of the
supplemental role that mediation and ADR could fulfill.85
In some states, another form of ADR was developed whereby certain cases,
generally those involving only moderate amounts of money, were automatically
forced into an arbitration-like process. This form of arbitration was essentially a
streamlined simplistic form of trial, presided over by a panel of arbitrators
(usually lawyers who volunteered their time)." In this court initiated arbitration,
evidence and procedural rules were relaxed in an effort to reach a quick and just
result.8 Arbitrators tended to be more concerned with equitable principles like
fairness, than with strict adherence to the substantive law. 89 The disputants could
either accept the decision (at which point it would become legally enforceable),
or proceed with a full trial.9
Supporters of this mandatory non-binding arbitration" first introduced it as a
means to save courts' time, and to save litigants' money. 92 However, subsequent
research has shown that arbitration may not save courts time at all because those
who tended to accept the findings of mandatory non-binding arbitration were the
same people who would have settled their cases prior to trial anyway.93
Moreover, it did not save litigants money either because the fees attorneys
charged to proceed with arbitration were similar to what they would have
81. Hensler, supra note 77, at 174-75.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Id. at 171.
84. Id. at 172.
85. Id. at 173.
86. Hensler, supra note 77, at 177-78.
87. Id. at 177, 180.
88. Id. at 177.
89. See id. (quoting an arbitrator as saying, "I've heard a case where the equities were clearly all on one
side, but not necessarily the law. Then we ... might say: 'Let's be fair here! If anyone wants to appeal, the
judge can be legal."') (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 177-78.
91. Also known as court-annexed arbitration, or judicial arbitration. Id. at 178.
92. Hensler, supra note 77, at 178.
93. Id. at 178.
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charged to settle the case.94 Despite these drawbacks, one benefit of arbitration is
it tends to leave a litigant feeling like they were treated more fairly than those
who had their case decided via settlement or some other form of attorney
negotiation.95 The likely reason for this is that it makes litigants feel like that their
case was given at least a form of a day in court, rather than being decided
through a backroom deal.96
Even if a case is not of the type that is eligible for mandatory non-binding
arbitration, it is possible that arbitration may also be mandated via contract.9"
Unlike mandatory non-binding arbitration, contractual obligation is generally
treated as binding, and not subject to appeal except in extreme cases." Businesses
found arbitration particularly attractive because it allowed them to resolve their
disputes away from juries that were presumed to carry an anti-business bias."
However, some businesses became dissatisfied with arbitration because in some
cases the cost of the arbitration hearing was not much less than it would have
been to take the case to court.'" Moreover, critics argued arbitrators were too
focused on reaching compromise, rather than vindicating rights and assigning
responsibilities.o
In response to the perceived deficiencies in contractual arbitration, business
leaders looked toward mediation as a means of resolving their disputes.0 2
Mediation offered businesses and other litigants an opportunity to find a mutually
beneficial solution to their dispute. 03 To the courts, mediation, like mandatory
non-binding arbitration, offered another opportunity to potentially lighten their
case loads, and reduce the costs of litigation."'4 Over time, mediation has come to
replace mandatory non-binding arbitration as the primary tool courts use to
lighten their case loads.'0o
Although mediation is popular, it is not without its critics. Some authors
criticize mediation because it deprives, or at least delays, a litigant of their day in
court. Further, it places the enforcement of substantive law in the hands of an
unregulated and privatized industry.'" Critics point to the fact that mediators,
unlike arbitrators, often lack experience or expertise.' Nor do mediators have
94. Id. at 179.
95. Id. at 179.
96. Id. at 179-80.
97. See Hensler, supra note 77, at 181.
98. Id. at 183-84.
99. Id. at 184.
100. Id. at 182.
101. Id.
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any cap upon the fees they charge like arbitrators do.'os Moreover, like mandatory
non-binding arbitration before it, mediation does not appear to have reduced the
costs of litigation.' Perhaps the greatest drawback to mediation is that it appears
to only be effective when the parties are willing to negotiate and compromise."o
However, the sad reality of disputes means that if it has come to the point where
parties are willing to sue each other, that type of compromise may not be
possible."'
In many respects, Ms. Doe may prefer both arbitration and mediation over
formal litigation. In arbitration, Ms. Doe would face a far less formal system that
may be easier to navigate without counsel. Likewise, mediation may be attractive
because the parties would be reaching a mutually beneficial result, rather than
having one forced upon them. This would be particularly attractive to Ms. Doe if
she has to maintain social and professional connections with the other party. Yet,
one serious problem presented by both alternatives is that it would not
necessarily solve Ms. Doe's problem of not being able to afford her day in court
since both are costly. Even if the arbitration or mediation proceeded smoothly,
Ms. Doe may still prefer not to use them because she did not get her day in court.
At the same time, the growth of the ADR industry demonstrates, at least in part,
dissatisfaction with the expense and cost of the formal justice system. As such,
even given the defects in the ADR systems, Ms. Doe may still prefer to seek
relief in ADR. Moreover, given that arbitration clauses are now routinely written




Prior to the 1789 revolution, the French legal system was divided between a
Roman law system in the south, and a customary law system in the north."' The
Roman law emphasized written laws, while the customary law was governed by
the informal oral customs of local tribes. " Although the two systems were very
108. Id. (arbitration fees are generally capped by local legislation).
109. Id. at 188.
110. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil
Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 879-880 (1997).
ill. See id.
112. Shawn Bates & David Hricik, Arbitration Clauses For Ongoing Relationships, HOUSTON LAWYER,
Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 11 (stating that arbitration clauses are now routine in business contracts).
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different, the common aspects of both were inequality, authoritarianism, and
feudal property rights."'
After the revolution, there was a movement to try and create a national legal
system that would apply to all areas of France."'6 The revolutionary lawmakers
had envisioned an informal legal system that deemphasized the role of what was
perceived as an elitist legal profession."' However, these goals proved too radical
to get widespread acceptance, and the revolutionary lawmakers had to settle for a
civil adjudication system."' Ironically, in their desire to create a more equitable
justice system, the revolutionary era lawmakers created a code that was so
lacking in detailed guidelines that it led to an arbitrary form of justice."' Even
though the code introduced by the revolutionary lawmakers was unsuccessful,
the themes introduced by the code, such as the freedom of individuals and the
idea that the law emanates from the state, would prove influential to later legal
reformers." 0
After taking power Napoleon Bonaparte envisioned a vast legal reform
project that would create a legal system that was simple, easily understandable by
laymen, and could be adapted over time.12' Napoleon's first project was the
creation of the enormously influential and successful French Civil Code.122 After
the success of the Civil Code, the reformers turned their attention towards
drafting a national civil procedure code.'23 The reformers had experienced the
excesses of the revolutionary era civil procedure code, and chose to distance
themselves from that by returning to the formalistic procedures that had existed
prior to the revolutionary period.'2 The 1806 Civil Procedure Code was very
strict and formal, to the point where a claim could be lost or won based on
compliance with the formalities of the code.125
Over time, reformers became concerned that the 1806 code lacked the
flexibility needed to address the problems of the twentieth century.' In
recognition of this, in 1969 a commission was formed for the purpose of drafting
a new civil procedure code."' After six years of work, the commission was
115. Id. at 3-4.
116. Id. at 4.
117. A. Wijffels, French Civil Procedure (1806-1975), in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
26 (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2005).
118. Id.
119. Id.at28.
120. ELLIOTr, supra note 113, at 4-5.
121. See id. at 6-9.
122. See id. at 5.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Wijffels, supra note 117, at 30-3 1.
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finally able to produce the New Code of Civil Procedure in 1975.128 Like the
Napoleonic Civil Code before it, the New Code of Civil Procedure was intended
to use simple non-legalese language that could be easily understood.129 This code
emphasized, "increasing flexibility, promoting conciliation and.. .the principle of
giving due hearing to the parties."3 o
B. Legal Costs and Legal Aid
The cost of filing an action in French courts can be very high for potential
litigants. Not only do they have to worry about their own legal costs, but they
also may be concerned that if they lose they may have to pay their opponents
costs. In order to make the justice system available to people of all classes, the
French government has taken a very proactive approach to try and offer legal
assistance and legal aid.
Under the French system, there are two general categories of legal costs: les
d6pens and les frais irr6p6tibles.13' The former category is composed of all costs
that are, "legally necessary to pursue [a] trial."1 32 The literal cost that the judicial
proceeding has on the state is borne by the state, and neither party would be
obligated to pay it.'33 Costs that are included within depens are:
1. [t]he fees, taxes government fees or expenses charged by the court
registry .. .; 2. [t]he costs of translating documents when this is made
necessary by law or an international commitment; 3. [p]ayments for
witnesses; 4. [e]xperts' fees; 5. [flixed disbursements; 6. [f]ees of public
officers; 7. [flees of attorneys in so far as they are regulated, including
fees for the closing speeches; 8. [t]he costs incurred in notifying a
document abroad; 9. [t]he costs of interpretation and translation made
necessary by procedural steps taken abroad at the request of a court. . .
It is important to note that this rule does not include the cost of an avocat
(attorney), except for those aspects of the avocat's work that are regulated by the
state, or where the parties are required 3 to take an avocat. 3 6 The prevailing party
128. Id. at 168.
129. L Cadiet, The New French Code of Civil Procedure (1975), in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE 54-55 (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2005).
130. ELLIOTr,supra note 113, at 167.
131. Loic Cadiet, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and Delay. The French Perspective, in CIVIL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS 311 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999).
132. Id.
133. Raymond Martin & Jacques Martin, France, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CIVIL
PROCEDURE 93 (P. Lemmens Ed., Kluwer Law International 2002) (1991).
134. Nouveau code de proc6dure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 695 (Fr.).
135. As will be discussed more thoroughly below, in some French courts legal representation is
mandatory while in others, it is not.
136. Simon Whittaker, Civil Procedure, in PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 114 (John Bell et al. eds.,
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will, in the ordinary case, have their d6pens fees paid by the opposing party,
whether it is the defendant or the plaintiff.17 This rule developed out of a general
presumption that the "loser had done a wrong by insisting on his legal position,
which had been proven in court to be unjustified."' If the losing litigant is
unable, due to financial hardship etc, to pay these fees, then a judge may at her
discretion order the successful party to bear his own cost.'
The second category of legal costs includes all costs that are not "strictly
necessary to the pursuit of the trial, especially lawyer's fees."'" This latter
category of costs can be quite burdensome for litigants.141 Contingency fees, or
fixed fee agreements, are prohibited as a matter of public policy.142 Generally, this
category of costs had to be borne by the party who incurred them. If a litigant
wants to recover costs of this category they need to show either that the other
party's behavior has been unfair or vexatious, or convince the court to award
these additional costs as a matter of equity.143 Recently, judges have been given
greater discretion to allocate these costs as well.'" Although these costs may be
burdensome, some scholars have argued that the simplicity and flexibility of the
French legal system makes it, "probably one of the cheapest in the world."45
If a litigant is unable to afford even these relatively modest costs of civil
litigation they may take advantage of the comprehensive legal aid system that has
existed since 1972.146 Legal aid provides a party with the assistance of an attorney
and whatever other legal officials the law may require.]47 To apply for legal aid, a
litigant must submit an application to one of the many legal aid offices located in
every court of first instance.148 The legal aid office will grant the application if the
litigant presents a meritorious claim,4 9 and the applicant meets the income limits
2008).
137. Nouveau code de proc6dure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 696 (Fr.).
138. MAIN, supra note 2, at 23.
139. Martin, supra note 133, at 93.
140. Cadiet, supra note 131, at 312.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Whittaker, supra note 136, at 114-15; See also Nouveau code de proc6dure civile (N.C.P.C.] art.
32-1 (Fr.) (vexatious litigation), and Nouveau code de procddure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 700 (Fr.) (recognizing
the judge's discretion to award additional costs).
144. Cadiet, supra note 131, at 312.
145. Daniel Soulez Lariviere, Overview of the Problems of French Civil Procedure, 45 Am. J. Comp. L.
737, 738-739 (1997).
146. Symposium, Eleventh Annual Phillip D. Reed Memorial Issue Partnerships Across Borders: A
Global Forum on Access to Justice: an Overview of Civil Legal Services Delivery Models, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 225, 226 (2000) (currently, the legal aid system is regulated by a 1991 statute, and subsequent amendments,
that were passed to deal with some of the defects in the 1972 system) [hereinafter Overview of Civil Legal
Services].
147. Martin, supra note 133, at 95.
148. Overview of Civil Legal Services, supra note 146, at 227.
149. Id.
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set each year by the Finance Act.5 o In 2004, to receive full legal aid the applicant
must have an income of less than eight hundred and sixty euros per month, and to
receive partial legal aid the applicant's income cannot be more than 1,223 euros
per month."' As of 2002, it was thought that nearly a half of the French
population was eligible for legal aid. Both plaintiffs and defendants have equal
access to legal aid regardless of what type of court they may currently be in.'
If a person who receives legal aid later prevails in the action, then the state
may take back the costs of the legal services from any award granted to the
litigant.'" Moreover, if the recipient of legal aid loses, and is ordered to pay the
legal costs of the other party, legal aid will not cover that cost.' Yet, if the
litigant's income is low enough to receive legal aid, it is likely a judge would
take that into consideration and waive the costs to the other party.
Since 1982, parties have been able to choose whatever lawyer they wish
under this system.' 7 Until 1972, attorneys who provided legal aid had to do so
without pay.'" Now, attorneys and other legal service providers are given at least
a modest pay; however, this pay is still lower than the usual costs of their
services. " Recently, a reform movement has developed to raise the pay for legal
aid in order to ensure that all people are given the same quality of lawyer,
regardless of their economic status.'
If a party may not be fully eligible for legal aid, or otherwise wants
additional protection, they may sign up for additional protection in the form of
legal protection insurance. 6 ' Legal protection insurance is relatively
inexpensive. 62 This insurance not only promises to defend the insured in the case
of a legal action, but also will provide the insured representation in the event the
insured must bring an action herself.63
Given the breadth and scope of legal aid it is likely that Ms. Doe would
qualify for at least partial, and perhaps even full, legal aid. In any case, since
legal aid centers are located in every court of first instance, it would be easy for
Ms. Doe to locate a legal aid center and discover if she is qualified or not. If she
were not qualified, she may have, as a part of her business insurance, purchased
150. Martin, supra note 133, at 95.
151. 2 ALEXANDER LAYTON & HUGH MERCER, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE § 51.117 (2d ed. 2004).
152. Martin, supra note 133, at 95.
153. Id.
154. WHITTAKER, supra note 136, at 115.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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legal protection insurance. Her insurance company would then provide her with a
lawyer to represent her in her action against the contractor. Assuming Ms. Doe
could afford an attorney, she still may be deterred from filing a formal action
because of the risk that under a fee-shifting system she may have to pay the
contractor's legal fees as well if she lost.
C. Court Selection
Before filing her case, Ms. Doe would also have to consider which among
the many courts available in France would fit her best. There are approximately
eight courts of first instance in France.'" However, the only courts that Ms. Doe
would realistically consider are: the tribunaux de grande instance (hereinafter
TGI), the tribunaux d'instance (hereinafter TI), the neighborhood courts, and
finally the commercial courts.165 The TGI is considered the ordinary court of first
instance, and all other courts are special courts.'" Each will be considered in turn.
TGI courts have general jurisdiction over all civil matters, subject only to the
limitation that the claim must be in excess of ten thousand euros.6 1 Since TGI
courts can hear all types of matters, they also tend to be the busiest of all the
courts.6 1 Procedures before the TGI tend to be the most formal of all the courts,
and are written rather than oral.'69 Since TGI procedures are more complex and
formal than the special courts, legal representation is required.7 o
Closely related to TGI courts are TI courts.' 7' The two courts are related
because the president 2 of the local TGI court also has control over any TI courts
within that area.'7 ' TI courts are special courts that may only hear matters the
legislature allots to them, which is generally small civil cases worth between four
and ten thousand euros. 174 The procedure in TI courts is simpler than the
procedure before the TGI courts.'7 1 Moreover, TI courts also focus more heavily
164. ELLIOTT, supra note 113, at 86-87 (the eight courts mentioned were: tribunaux de grande instance,
tribunaux d'instance, neighborhood courts, commercial courts, employment tribunals, agricultural tenancy
tribunals, social security tribunals, and the disability dispute tribunals).
165. See Id.
166. Martin, supra note 133, at 26-27.
167. ELLIOTr, supra note 113, at 87.
168. Id.
169. See Id. at 173 (compares special courts with the TGI by noting that special courts follow an oral
procedure, and by implication that the TGI follows a written procedure).
170. Cadiet, supra note 129, at 60-61.
171. ELLiorr, supra note 113, at 89.
172. Id. at 87-88 (noting that the president is the administrative head of a TGI court, and decides what
judges hear what type of cases, and what judges are assigned to TI courts).
173. Id. at 89.
174. Id. at 88.
175. RENtE Y. NAUTA, French Civil Procedure, in ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD 131, §
5.4.3(a) (Henk J. Snijders ed., 1996).
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on conciliation than other courts. Legal representation is not required to appear
before a TI court.'77
Starting in 2002, litigants also had the choice to have their dispute heard
before neighborhood courts so long as the claim was not worth more than four
thousand euros. 7 ' Neighborhood courts are composed of lay judges that tend to
be local professionals with some legal experience. 79 These courts are still
relatively new, and some commentators criticize them for lacking the
competency to hear cases.so
One last category of courts is the commercial courts. Commercial courts
were first created in the middle ages to hear business and commercial matters,
and have existed ever since.'"' Commercial courts have jurisdiction over
commercial matters including: monetary disputes between two businesses;
disputes between business partners; disputes over commercial transactions; and
some cases of receivership and compulsory liquidation.182 Judges are not
professionally trained, but are business professionals, elected by the local
business community.' The procedures in these courts tend to be informal.' 8 It
has become increasingly difficult to find qualified judges to serve in these posts
because they are unpaid, and involve decisions covering very complex legal
issues.' Commercial court judges have been criticized as incompetent, and the
system has been plagued by allegations of corruption and self-dealing.'86 An
attempt at reforming the commercial court system was met by harsh resistance,
and the reform movement was ultimately abandoned in 2002.87
Ms. Doe would likely prefer to have her case heard before a commercial
court or a TGI court. A neighborhood court would be out of the question because
her dispute is certainly worth more than four thousand euros, and even if it was
not she may not want to have her case heard by lay judges. She would likely
qualify to have her case heard before the commercial court, since it involves a
dispute between two businesses (her restaurant and the contractor). This may be
an attractive option for her given the flexibility and informality of the
proceedings, and the fact that the judges are from the local business community.
176. ELLIOTT, supra note 113, at 89, 173.
177. Id. at 89.
178. Id. at 89-90.
179. Id. at 90.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 91.
183. Id. at 92.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Martin, supra note 133, at 28.
187. ELLIOTr, supra note 113, at 93 (indicating that the reformers would have hired professional judges
to oversee the lay judges, and required lay judges to report all their commercial interests in order to avoid
potential conflicts of interest).
205
2010 / Threshold Obstacles to Justice
At the same time, if she does not have a prominent place in the business
community she may be dissuaded by the allegations of corruption and lack of
competency from those judges. In many respects, the TI court emphasis on
informal procedures and conciliation may be attractive to her, but it is possible
her dispute may be worth more than ten thousand euros. If that was the case, then
she may prefer to choose a TGI court, because these courts appear to have the
most well trained judges. Yet, one serious drawback to the TGI courts is that Ms.
Doe would need to secure legal representation.
D. Pleading
France, like most civil law countries, follows a fact pleading, rather than a
notice pleading, standard. As such, in order for a complaint to be valid in all
courts in France it must contain:
1. [t]he name of the court before which the claim is brought;
2. [t]he subject-matter of the claim with a presentation of the issues of
facts and of law;
3. [t]he statement that, should the defendant fail to appear, he/she shall
run the risk that a judgment be entered against him/her based solely
on the evidence produced by his/her opponent;
4. [w]here appropriate, statements relating to the identity of real
property as required by the land registry in relation to their
advertisement."
In addition, the plaintiff must describe the exhibits that will be used to
support her claim. 89 If the complaint is before a TI or commercial court it must
also contain a statement as to where a conciliation attempt will take place, and
the complaint must be served within fifteen days prior to the hearing date.,9*
Before Ms. Doe could file a complaint she would need to have a clear
understanding of the facts and laws that may be implicated. While she need not
prove her case in the complaint alone, this system goes beyond simply giving
notice to the other side. Instead, this system appears to require her to have a clear
legal theory which she must back up with specific facts and evidence. Although
she may not have to attach the evidence directly to the complaint, she would at
least need access to that evidence so that she could describe all the evidence she
intends to use at trial. This system could be potentially burdensome to Ms. Doe if
she is proceeding pro se, or does not have access to the evidence at this point in
time.
188. N.C.P.C. art. 56 (Fr.).
189. Id.
190. N.C.P.C. art. 836-837, 855-856 (Fr.).
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E. Alternative Dispute Resolution
France, along with most countries in the world, has had to cope with an
incredible growth in litigation. 9' One response to this growth in litigation has
been to utilize ADR to lighten the case load of the formal court system.'" ADR
offers an attractive solution to this problem because it generally "[offers] speedy,
non-violent, and non-formalistic proceedings."' 3 At the same time, the
informality of the system also poses a risk that the fundamental rights of the
parties may not be protected.'" Thus, as the ADR movement has grown, it has
attempted to ensure that these fundamental rights are protected.'
One form of ADR that has been attempted, without great success, is
conciliation.'96 Conciliation can either be undertaken voluntarily, or in some cases
instituted by the judge.'97 Conciliation is essentially a form of negotiation.'" The
parties meet and try and resolve the problem at hand without having to resort to
the courts.'" In some cases, a third party is called in to help mediate the dispute.200
The third party's role in the conciliation can range from a passive consultation
role, to a more active role whereby the third party will try to work out a solution
to the problem at hand.2' Often, connercial contracts contain a clause that the
parties will at least make a good faith attempt at conciliation before resorting to
the judicial process.202
Conciliation is generally conducted by neutral third parties called
conciliators. 203 Conciliators are legal professionals, with at least three years of
legal experience, whose purpose is to try and facilitate negotiation between the
parties.204 The goal of the conciliator is to reach a friendly settlement that both
parties can agree to.20s If the parties do reach a settlement, then they can either
206
jointly request that the judge make the agreement legally enforceable, or form a
191. Cadiet, supra note 131, at 291.
192. Id. at 318.
193. Id.
194. See Id.
195. See Id. (author cites the following as examples of fundamental rights: nature justice of the
adversarial principle, and recourse to a judge).
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non-binding private agreement.2 07 Although recent reforms have tried to place
more emphasis on conciliation, the record of conciliation's success is mixed.208
The New Code of Civil Procedure provides that it is the duty of the judge to
mediate between the parties.2 * As a part of this duty, a judge in any court can
appoint a mediator, and encourage the parties to mediate the dispute.210 Judges
before TI courts are further empowered to order conciliation if the parties
themselves elect it,"' or if the judge in his discretion orders it.2 2 Due to this, TI
courts often seek to use conciliation.' Indeed, it is common practice for
complaints before TI courts to first ask for conciliation, and only then proceed
with formal litigation.2 4
For those that would prefer a more adjudicative form of ADR, arbitration is
widely available in France. Arbitration in France has had a long and complicated
history, moving from distrust to gradual acceptance of arbitration in French
culture.215 Historically, the French distrusted arbitration, allowing its limited use,
but generally viewing it with suspicion.216 In the revolutionary era, the
revolutionary lawmakers turned towards arbitration as the preferred method to
resolve disputes.2 7 Yet, within a short period of time, this widespread use of
arbitration was abused by people in power, and as such the Napoleonic era
restricted the types of disputes that could be arbitrated.2 8 It was not until after
World War I that France started to see a place for arbitration as a means of
promoting business interests.219 Although arbitration is now accepted in France,
its use is limited to only those rights of which parties have free disposal. 220 The
civil code does not expressly define the phrase "rights of which [parties] have
free disposal," but the code does state arbitration is forbidden in "matters of
status and capacity of the persons, in those relating to divorce and judicial
separation or on controversies concerning public bodies and institutions and more
generally in all matters which public policy is concerned."22' The common thread
among all of those categories is that they are legal relationships that have
important public policy repercussions. By excluding these situations from those
207. Cadiet, supra note 131, at 320.
208. Id.
209. N.C.P.C. art. 21 (Fr.).
210. N.C.P.C. art. 131-1 (Fr.); Cadiet, supra note 131, at 323-24.
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which may be arbitrated, the code appears to be stating that these situations are
simply too important to public policy to be left to arbitration. The fact that the
code makes this distinction shows that although the code may recognize that
arbitration can be valuable, it still looks at arbitration with some suspicion.
22Arbitration clauses are contractual provisions. To elect arbitration, the two
parties to the contract have to expressly state that any dispute arising under the
contract will be decided under arbitration.223 Assuming that the arbitration
224
agreement is valid and meets all requirements, any dispute that arises under the
contract must be heard before an arbitration tribunal, and cannot generally be
heard before a state court.25
Arbitrators are generally allowed to set their own rules of procedure, but
226must also conform to some fundamental aspects of French law. The popularity
of arbitration clauses has lead to an increase in the formality and standardization
of arbitration procedures.227 As arbitration becomes more standardized, it runs the
risk of detracting from its principle benefits: "flexibility, economy and speed."228
One drawback to an arbitration award is the very real potential that it could
be appealed or not enforced. An arbitrator has no power to enforce his judgment,
and as such the parties must seek an enforcement award from the court.229 If the
parties have not expressly waived the right to appeal in the agreement, the
arbitration award can be appealed on several grounds.23 0 Even if the parties have
waived the right to appeal, it can still be appealed in limited circumstances.23'
However, if an enforcement order232 has been passed down by a court, then that
order cannot be appealed.233
Given the cost and potential social disruption caused by formal litigation,
Ms. Doe may prefer to use either conciliation or arbitration. Conciliation would
prove attractive in that its focus is to try and reach a result with which both
parties are satisfied. This would be particularly attractive to Ms. Doe and the
222. See N.C.P.C. art. 1443.
223. N.C.P.C. art. 1442-1443; see also Martin, supra note 133, at 122 ("To be valid, an agreement
clause must be written in the main agreement or on an appendix to which the main agreement specifically
refers.").
224. See N.C.P.C. art. 1447-1459 (specifying all the requirements for a valid arbitration agreement).
225. Martin, supra note 133, at 122.
226. Id. at 123 (noting the following aspects of French law with which parties must conform: "they must
decide within the limits of the matter of the dispute, they must leave to the parties the burden of bring forth facts
and of evidence, they must respect the principle of adversarial procedure.").
227. Cadiet, supra note 131, at 323.
228. Id.
229. See Martin, supra note 133, at 124.
230. N.C.P.C. art. 1482; see also Martin, supra note 133, at 124.
231. N.C.P.C. art. 1484; see also Martin, supra note 133, at 124 ("[E]ven if an appeal has been ruled
out, the parties can appeal to seek the annulment of the award if a fundamental rule of procedure has not been
respected.").
232. An enforcement order is the term for an arbitration award that has been approved of by a formal
court. N.C.P.C. art. 1457, 1488.
233. N.C.P.C. art. 1488; Martin, supra note 133, at 125.
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defendant if they intended to maintain a regular business relationship. In that
case, they may have included a conciliation clause within their contract. Even
without this clause, it is likely the judge will at least encourage (or if it is a TI
court judge, order) the parties to engage in some conciliation. However,
conciliation may still prove ineffective if the parties differences are irreconcilable
at this point.
. In that case, Ms. Doe would likely prefer arbitration. Arbitration would be
more attractive because it would offer a cheaper and, at least potentially, more
flexible procedure than what is available at the state courts, and also could offer a
resolution of the dispute that conciliation may not be able to provide. On the
other hand, the increased standardization of arbitration procedure, and the lack of
finality of the award, may have made this an undesirable option for Ms. Doe.
Assuming Ms. Doe did want to proceed with arbitration, she would have had to
include in the original contract with the contractor that any dispute arising under
this contract is to be heard by an arbitrator.
V. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
A. Historical Context
The history of the development of Chinese civil procedure reflects the
turmoil and chaos that accompanied the creation of The People's Republic of
China (hereinafter P.R.C.). 234 The first uniform civil procedure code was created
by the Qing Dynasty in 1910 and was based primarily on the civil law code of
Japan.' It is difficult to say how effective this code would have been because
within a year the Qing Dynasty was overthrown by the Nationalist
Government.2 36 The Nationalist victory over the then-weakened Qing Empire237
was short lived and a civil war developed between Nationalist forces and the
Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter C.C.P) forces. 238 To resist Japanese
invaders during World War II, the two factions combined under the united
front.239 During this period, the C.C.P. controlled areas essentially followed the
system developed by the Nationalist Government.2" One important caveat to this
is that the C.C.P. placed great emphasis on the principle of "mediation first and
trial second." 24' The united front eventually defeated the Japanese invaders.
234. See WEI Luo, THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 1-5 (2006).
235. Id. at 1-2.
236. See Id. at 2.
237. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA, 243-63 (2nd ed. 1990) (describing the
causes of the downfall of the Qing Empire).
238. See LUO, supra note 234, at 2.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 3.
24 1. Id.
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Unfortunately, peace did not last long and shortly thereafter the country returned
to a violent civil war.42
In 1949, the C.C.P. prevailed and founded the People's Republic of China.m
Eight months before the P.R.C. was founded, the C.C.P. had issued an order
abolishing all Nationalist Party laws. However, political turmoil caused by events
like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution stalled attempts to
codify a new civil procedure law.2" Although there was no codified system of
civil procedure during this time, The Supreme People's Court promulgated rules
upon which the local courts could rely on.24
In 1978, the P.R.C., under the newly restored leader Deng Xiaoping,
underwent a process of modernization.246 Deng Xiaoping emphasized that in
order for the P.R.C. to modernize it must also reform and rebuild the legal
system." As a part of that process, the P.R.C. promulgated an experimental civil
procedure code in 1982, only to fully implement a new civil procedure code in
1991.248 Technically, once the civil procedure code was promulgated, the role of
the Supreme People's Court was limited to merely interpreting the text of the
code, and only doing so upon specific request from lower courts.249 However,
practically speaking, the Supreme People's Court still issues very important
interpretations of the code, sometimes even without a request from lower
courts.250 Although not technically binding, these opinions serve an important
function of filling in gaps in the civil procedure code and are widely regarded as
binding."
B. Legal Costs and Legal Aid
The Chinese legal system can be very costly for any potential litigant. In
order to address this issue, the Chinese government has introduced a fairly
242. SPENCE, supra note 237, at 459-64.
243. Id. at 486-88.
244. LUO, supra note 234, at 3-4. The Great Leap Forward was a program initiated by Chairman Mao to
leap China into the industrial age by encouraging industrial development at the local level. SPENCE, supra note
237, at 544-45. Due to widespread corruption, and faulty planning, the programs lead to starvation of
approximately 20 million people and various social problems. Id. at 552-53. The Cultural Revolution was
started by Chairman Mao as part of a power struggle within the Communist Party. Id. at 571-78. Although the
purpose of the movement was to bring China back to its worker-based roots, it turned into essentially a witch
hunt into anyone suspected of anti communist activities and contributed to Mao's downfall. Id. at 576-86.
245. LUo, supra note 234, at 4.
246. Id.
247. See Gerard J. Clark, An Introduction to the Legal Profession in China in the Year 2008, 41
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 833, 838-39 (2008).
248. LUo, supra note 234, at 4-5.
249. Id. at 22.
250. Id.
251. See Shizhou Wang & Hong Yao, People's Republic of China, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE 21 (P. Lemmens Ed., Kluwer Law International 2002) (2001); see also LuO, supra
note 234, at 22-24.
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extensive legal aid system to provide assistance to those who could not otherwise
afford it. In addition to this system, Chinese lawyers have an obligation to
provide pro bono representation, and there are also many legal aid clinics
available.
In any given case, a litigant has to be concerned about two general costs of
litigation: the payment to the court itself and lawyer fees.252 First, the amount a
plaintiff has to pay to the court in advance of litigation varies depending on
whether the case involves property and on the amount in controversy (if a
defendant attempts to file a counter-claim, she may also be responsible for court
fees in regards to her counterclaim). 253 For example, if it is a property dispute of
between approximately fifty thousand to one-hundred thousand Yuan RMB,2
then the litigants must pay around three percent of that amount in court fees.55 In
contrast, if it is a case involving divorce, then the litigant may only be
responsible for ten to fifty Yuan RMB.256 As one can see, if a property case is in
dispute, the court fee can turn out to be quite substantial.257 Perhaps in recognition
of the potential burden caused by these fees, the civil procedure code provides
that "[p]arties who truly have difficulties to pay litigation expenses may,
according to relevant regulations, petition the people's court to postpone, reduce,
or waive [sic] the payment." 258 Similarly, although Chinese judges rarely order
one party to pay the other's legal fees, those fees are often included in any claim
for damages.259 In some areas, such as Shanghai, the government has regulated
legal fees so that they cannot exceed a certain amount.260 However, in other areas
the fees are simply set by the market without limit.2 6'
If a litigant is unable to afford the legal fees, it may be possible for the
litigant to apply for legal aid.262 Until recently, there was no unified government
sponsored legal aid system in China.263 At the insistence of Justice Minister Xiao
Yang, in 1994 the P.R.C. committed itself to the establishment of a legal aid
252. Wang & Yao, supra note 251, at 101.
253. Id. at 102-03.
254. Yuan RMB is the currency of the P.R.C. As of February 16th, 2010, these numbers convert to
approximately $7,300 to $14,700 in United States currency. Greenwichmeantime.com, China Currency
Converter, http://wwp.greenwichmeantime.com/time-zone/asia/china/currency.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
255. Wang & Yao, supra note 251, at 102.
256. Id. As of February 16th, 2010, these numbers convert to approximately $1.50, and $7.00 in United
States currency. China Currency Converter, supra note 254.
257. See id.
258. Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by President Yang Shangkun, effective on April 9, 1991), art.
107, translated in Luo, supra note 234.
259. Wang & Yao, supra note 251, at 101.
260. Should Attorney Fees be Prescribed?, BEUING REVIEW, Mar. 14, 2002, at 20 (in 2002, "the fee for
legal consultancies [was] 130 yuan per case, 250 yuan for creating documents on legal affairs, 30,150 yuan for
handling a criminal case and 70,150 yuan for handling a civil case.").
261. See id.
262. See Wang & Yao, supra note 251, at 105 (defining legal aid).
263. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 211,
217-221 (1999).
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system.264 The cause for legal aid proved attractive in China because it was seen
not only as an essential part of Chinese modernization and reform of the legal
system, but an embodiment of the principle of socialism with Chinese
characteristics. 265 The P.R.C. followed up on this commitment by establishing
legal aid bureaus on both the national and local level,26 and by emphasizing that
it is the duty of the government to provide legal aid.267 Due to these efforts,
between 1993-2003 legal aid services were able to handle eight hundred
thousand cases.2 68 Yet, despite these efforts, there remains a serious disparity
between the rural and urban areas in access for legal aid.269
In order to qualify for legal aid a potential litigant must always meet the
income requirements, and in some provinces may also have to satisfy the
additional requirements of residency and subject matter.270 Generally, a litigant
can qualify for legal aid if he meets the standard for economic hardship as
determined by the local Bureau of Civil Affairs. 271 However, both the economic
standard and the burden of proof can vary widely between areas.272 Yet, there is
some indication that in practice legal aid bureaus are more flexible in eligibility
requirements than what the local standard indicates.273 Bearing that in mind, there
are still doubtlessly many people who may not meet the standard of economic
hardship, but are nonetheless unable to afford an attorney.274
Assuming that a litigant does meet the income requirements, in some areas
they may also have to demonstrate that they are a local resident, or have a valid
temporary residency permit.275 This measure impacts mostly migrant workers and
may reflect the general hostility towards migrant workers in China.276 However,
like the requirements for income, there is some indication that the residency
requirement is interpreted fairly flexibly.277
On the national level, the subject matter requirements are merely a
suggestion of what types of cases legal aid bureaus should prioritize.2 7 For
example, the 2003 regulation lists the following topics for legal aid: request for
state compensation; social security treatment; survivor's pensions or relief funds;
264. See id. at 222.
265. Id. at 223-24.
266. Huang Wei, Legal Aid Service Growing In China, BEIJING REVIEW, July 17, 2000, at 23-24.
267. Jian Fa, Legal Assistance: Government Duty, BEIJING REVIEW, Feb. 12, 2004, at 26.
268. Toward Comprehensive Legislation, BEllING REVIEW, Feb. 12, 2004.
269. Feng Jianhua, Expanding Legal Aid: Current Difficulties and Development Trends for Legal Aid
Project, BEIJING REVIEW, Apr. 19, 2007, at 23.
270. Liebman, supra note 263, at 242-46.
271. Id. at 242.
272. Id. at 242.
273. Id. at 243.
274. Jianhua, supra note 269, at 23.
275. Liebman, supra note 263, at 244.
276. Id. at 244-45.
277. Id. at 245.
278. Id. at 246.
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request for payments supporting family members; payment of labor services; and
"matters in which they are advocating civil rights and interests that arise as a
result of actions taken in the interest of justice."" 9 A court may also award legal
aid if the person is disabled, or if the court otherwise deems it necessary.280 In
contrast, "some local regulations explicitly prohibit certain types of cases."28'
This requirement demonstrates how legal aid is partially seen by the P.R.C. as a
means of encouraging certain policies and the causes the P.RC. determines to be
the most worthwhile. 282 At the same time, the ability of local provinces to
effectively exclude legal aid from certain areas demonstrates the power of local
provinces over legal aid.283
Even if a litigant is not able to obtain legal aid from the court, they may be
able to take advantage of other sources of legal aid.28 One such source is non-
governmental programs, primarily clinics run by legal educational institutions.285
These programs differ from government run legal aid both by the flexibility in
their eligibility requirements, and in the type of cases they will take. 286 For
example, the non-governmental programs are much more likely to take on a case
against a governmental entity.287 If a litigant does not qualify for a university run
program, they may also seek legal aid directly from individual attorneys. 288 Under
the Chinese Lawyers Law, attorneys have an obligation to reduce or exempt their
legal fees if the litigant is unable to pay in a matter relating to her lawful right or
interest.29 This obligation on the part of lawyers reflects the place of the legal
profession in China.290 Until 1996, lawyers were deemed to be state workers, and
even though that restriction has been removed, lawyers are still seen to have
obligations to the state. 29 1 However, the central government has left regulation of
this obligation largely in the hands of local provinces. 292 As such, similar to what
happened with legal aid in general, the degree that this obligation is enforced,
and the flexibility a lawyer has in meeting it, may vary between provinces.
279. Art. 10(1)-(6) Mf$a1)&# [Regulations on Legal Aid] (promulgated by Wen Jiabao, Premier,
Jul. 21, 2003, effective Sept. 1, 2003) translated in http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/ResidencySoc
Welfare/regsLegalAid.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
280. Wang & Yao, supra note 251, at 105.
281. Liebman, supra note 263, at 246 (providing examples of prohibited subject matter, such as
reputational rights, simple cases that do not need a lawyer, cases involving small sums of money, etc).
282. See id. at 245-46.
283. See id. at 246.
284. See id. at 248, 261.
285. Id. at 248.
286. Id. at 248-49.
287. Id. at 248.
288. Wang & Yao, supra note 251, at 105.
289. Id.
290. Liebman, supra note 263, at 261.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 262-64.
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Attorneys that provide this service often do not receive any compensation from
the state, and if they do it tends to be only to pay their expenses.29 As such, many
attorneys are not enthusiastic about this obligation, and it is unclear how actively
it is carried out.295
Although the exact cost of the litigation may vary depending on what area of
China Ms. Doe is in, it is likely that formal litigation would be economically
burdensome for her. Not only are attorney fees potentially high, but the filing fee
itself can be a substantial amount of money depending on the type of case
involved. Given Ms. Doe's economic position, she may not be able to proceed
with formal litigation without some legal assistance. The recent movement by the
P.R.C. to expand legal aid is very impressive in its scope, and availability.296 Yet,
as this comment has demonstrated, this system is still not without its flaws. It is
possible that Ms. Doe's local bureau may set a standard that she cannot meet, or
even if she could she may not be able to provide them with the necessary
documentation to prove her economic status. On the other hand, it is also
possible that construction litigation like this may be encouraged by the P.R.C.
government as a method to encourage economic growth. If that is true, it is more
likely that she could get support. Without that, her only options are to turn
towards the universities and individual attorneys. Yet, even then it is possible she
does not live near a university with a clinic, and perhaps even if she finds an
attorney willing to waive the fee that attorney may be less than enthusiastic in
defending a case he may get no compensation for.
C. Attorney Availability
Even if Ms. Doe could afford a lawyer, it may still be very difficult to find
one. Prior to the revolution, China had a small lawyer class; however, in the
1950's-1960's Mao Zedong carried out a campaign to abolish or suppress
lawyers because they were seen to be representatives of the bourgeoisie class.297
After the death of Mao Zedong his successor, Deng Xiaoping, encouraged the
growth of the legal profession as essential to economic reform.9  Since then,
lawyers have greatly increased in numbers to about 150,000 in 2000.299 Yet, this
number is still extremely small in comparison to China's population of 1.3
billion.3m To make matters worse, now that the legal profession is privatized,
lawyers tend to gather in urban, more developed areas, where they can make
294. Id. at 262-63.
295. Id. at 263.
296. Id. at 273.
297. Clark, supra note 247, at 838-839.
298. Id.
299. Margaret Y.K. Woo & Yaxin Wang, Civil Justice in China: An Empirical Study of Courts in Three
Provinces, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 922 (2005).
300. Id.; Liebman, supra note 263, at 240 (in 1996, of the 4,889,353 cases heard by courts, lawyers were
reported to only have participated in 863,574).
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more money.30 ' This situation makes lawyers a "scarce commodity in rural
areas."3O Accordingly, depending on her location, Ms. Doe may need to proceed
as a pro se plaintiff. This is a daunting proposition as the increased formality in
the Chinese civil procedure code makes proceeding without a lawyer very
difficult.30
D. Pleading
Assuming Ms. Doe is either able to pay for an attorney herself, or have one
provided for her by the state's legal aid system, her case still would have to
satisfy the pleading standard. At a bare minimum, the Civil Procedure Code of
the P.R.C. requires that all complaints state:
(1) The name, sex, age, ethnicity, occupation, working unit, and address
of parties or, if the parties are legal persons or organizations, their
names and addresses and the names and positions of their legal
representatives or principal leading personnel;
(2) The claims of the lawsuit and the facts and grounds on which the
evidence is based; and
(3) Evidence and its source, as well as the names and addresses of
witnesses.
Even though the plaintiff is required to attach evidence to her complaint, that
evidence need only demonstrate that the claim exists, and is ready to be heard by
the court.' As such, this requirement does not mean that the plaintiff must prove
her allegations at this stage, or even bring forward all of the evidence the plaintiff
has gathered.306 The parties are not required to bring forth this evidence until after
the complaint has been filed in a separate stage of the lawsuit, called "presenting
evidence by the parties," where the parties present their evidence to the court.3 O
In order for Ms. Doe to satisfy the pleading burden she would have to clearly
state her legal theory, the facts to support that legal theory, and also attach
evidence to support those facts. However, she would only need to attach enough
evidence to show that her claim is worthwhile, and would not be obligated to
301. Woo & Wang, supra note 299, at 923 (noting that in the city of Shanghai alone there are 3,522 full
time lawyers, while there are only 1,220 lawyers in the entire province of Guizhou).
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by President Yang Shangkun, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 110,
translated in LUO, supra note 234, at 76.
305. Letter from Wenyan Luo to author (Mar. 5, 2009) (on file with author); see also Letter from Prof.
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prove her claim at this stage. This requirement may nevertheless prove
burdensome if Ms. Doe has not been able to locate evidence for her claim, but it
is unclear how likely it is that this would be the case. Moreover, although the
rules require Ms. Doe to plead specific facts to support her claim, complaints are
still generally only two to five pages.m Given the brief length of complaints, it
appears that facts only have to be generally stated. As such, Ms. Doe would
likely be able to satisfy this pleading burden without too much difficulty.
E. Corruption
Strictly speaking, corruption is more of a reflection of defects in the political
process, rather than defects in the system of civil procedure. That being said,
corruption has a dramatic impact on civil procedure because its existence may
prevent a litigant from relying upon the civil procedure rules. 309 To ignore that
effect would create an unrealistic picture of how the system operates in practice.
Judicial corruption can take many forms, but five common types have
emerged in China.1 o First, judges are more interested in enforcing local, or
departmental, interests than in enforcing the law."' Second, judges either fail to
enforce the law, or delay unnecessarily. 312 Third, judges may abuse their power to
unlawfully infringe upon another's rights.3 1' Fourth, judges abuse their power to
get money or services for others.314 Fifth, judges violate the law for the benefit of
friends or family, and at the expense of others."' The common effect of all types
of judicial corruption is that it erodes the legitimacy of and citizens' faith in the
judicial system.
Judicial corruption is caused both by defects in the political process, as well
as within the judiciary.317 In the political arena, some of the causes for corruption
include: the difficulty in switching from a planned economy to a market
economy; the attempts at establishing a western-styled rule of law system where
none existed before; and the continued dominance of the political parties over the
judiciary.1 Within the judiciary some of the major causes for corruption include:
the lack of training and general poor quality of judges; the dependence of judges
upon the local government; and the poor equality of pay of judges.
308. Id.
309. See Zou KEYUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 162 (2006).





315. KEYUAN, supra note 309, at 161.
316. Id. at 162.
317. Id. at 162-63.
318. Id. at 163.
319. Id.
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The P.R.C. has become aware of the problems of corruption, and has taken a
proactive stance toward curbing it where possible.120 These reform efforts include
greater supervision of the judiciary, improving the quality and education of
judges, and various other measures.3 2' Although these reforms are promising,
judicial corruption still remains a serious problem in China, and likely will
remain so for many years.322
F. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Traditionally, Chinese culture has greatly emphasized some form of
mediation, rather than formal litigation, as the primary method to resolve
disputes.323 This preference for mediation is a reflection of both weaknesses in the
Chinese legal system, as well as the cultural and political climate of China. As is
discussed above, the Chinese legal system has serious problems of corruption and
accessibility that makes it an unattractive option to potential litigants.'2 There are
many causes for these problems, but they partially reflect a longstanding neglect,
if not hostility, towards the legal system that began as early as imperial China.2
As the corruption section mentioned above, a legal reform movement in China is
underway to fix these problems,3 26 and it is possible the preference for mediation
may decline as this effort becomes more successful in the years ahead.
Even if the preference for mediation declines, it is unlikely it will ever
disappear because of the importance it holds in both Confucian, and Maoist,
thought.3 27 One of the core tenets of Confucianism is that all aspects of society
should be designed to promote harmony among the community.328 Litigation,
with its adversarial nature, was thought to disrupt that harmony, and reflect a
personal failing on the parties involved.329 As such, mediation, with its focus on
both parties "winning," was thought to preserve the harmony of the community,
while still resolving the underlying dispute.3 o Similarly, Maoists believe that
social harmony, and the needs of the group, should be placed ahead of an
320. See KEYUAN, supra note 309, at 165.
321. Id. at 153-56, 165.
322. Id. at 172.
323. WE! Luo, supra note 234, at 13.
324. Colatrella, supra note 4, at 400.
325. Id. at 397-98. Author quotes the K'angshi Emperor (1662-1722) as saying, "Lawsuits would tend to
increase to a frightful amount, if people were not afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always
finding in them ready and perfect justice ... I desire, therefore, that those who have recourse to the tribunals
should be treated without pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with [the] law, and tremble to
appear before a magistrate." Id.
326. Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 36 INT'L
LAw. 1039, 1060-61 (2002).
327. Colatrella, supra note 4, at 396-97.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 396-97, 417.
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individual's interest in seeking relief."' Consequently, mediation was greatly
332
emphasized in Maoist policies and philosophy.
At the outset, it is important to make a distinction between the informal
people's mediation system, and mediation conducted by the people's courts.333
The people's mediation is a committee that is set up in each village in the
countryside, and each neighborhood in the city. 33M Each committee is composed
of three to nine mediators that are elected by the local citizens.3 " These
committees function more like traditional mediation, but they have limited legal
binding effect on the parties involved.3
In contrast, mediation conducted by the courts differs from informal
mediation (and western styled mediation) in three important ways: first, it is
conducted by a judge, and not a mediator separate from the court system; second,
the judge typically will intervene more than a mediator would; and third, the
discretion given to the judge to resolve the dispute.3" The people's court is only
empowered to use mediation when both parties voluntarily elect it, and if either
338
party withdraws from mediation, then the case goes forward without delay.
When mediating a dispute, a judge takes an active role in investigating the
dispute, including interviewing anyone who may be relevant to the facts at
hand.339 After collecting all the necessary information, a judge will assist the
parties in reaching a compromise. 340 If the case is largely non-fault based, that
process looks substantially similar to what traditional mediation looks like in
other systems. 4 ' However, mediation in the people's courts often takes a more
adjudicative quality, whereby a judge takes a more direct role in deciding the
dispute, and getting the parties to agree to his decision.342 This is perhaps best
exemplified by the strong distaste judges had towards contested divorce, and the
great lengths they would go to in order to prevent it.343 One criticism is that
ideally mediation should reach a result that both parties are comfortable with.
When the judge takes such an active role the concern is that the judge is creating
331. Id. at 398-99.
332. See id.
333. WEI LUO, supra note 234, at 13.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 13-14.
336. Id. at 14.
337. Phillip C. C. Huang, Court Mediation in China: Past and Present, 32 MODERN CHINA 275 (2006);
See also Colatrella, supra note 4, at 406, 420-21.
338. Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by President Yang Shangkun, effective Apr. 9, 1991), arts. 85,
91, translated in Luo, supra note 234, at 64, 66, 172.
339. Huang, supra note 337, at 286, 290 (in a divorce case one judge interviewed the husband, the wife,
the parents of both, their neighbors, and anyone else who may have had information about the couple).
340. Id. at 286.
341. Id. at 302.
342. See id. at 276.
343. Id. at 287.
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a result that he believes is fair, but not one that the parties believe is fair.' As
such, some of these reconciliations do not create the lasting peace in the
community that was intended.45
Despite the value that mediation undoubtedly holds in the public mind, the
use of people's mediation committees has steadily declined from 7,307,049 in
1986 to 4,646,139 in 2002.4 Similarly, although technically judges in the
people's courts are instructed to use mediation over trial whenever possible, in
practice, mediation in people's courts has steadily declined over the years.' As
use of people's mediation committees have declined, the popularity of the
people's courts has risen from 1,311,562 in 1986 to 4,393,306 in 2002.4' One
possible reason for this is the steady improvement in the quality and training of
judges in the people's courts.34 Another possible reason is that the increased
urbanization of P.R.C. society has loosened the ties that people may feel to their
local neighborhood or region.3 o Lastly, as the P.R.C. becomes more involved in
the global community, the disputes individual citizens experience may be too
complicated for traditional mediation courts to handle."' However, even though
use of mediation has declined, judges still regard the institution favorably."
Given the high costs of the justice system, and the endemic corruption within
the judicial ranks, Ms. Doe may prefer to proceed with mediation. Even if these
problems in the justice system did not exist, Ms. Doe would likely still prefer
mediation because of its cultural significance, and potential for creating a more
peaceful resolution of her dispute. If she proceeded with mediation conducted by
a judge, she would run the risk of having to confront the same issues of
corruption that plague the justice system. Even if the judge is not corrupt, there is
the risk the judge may decide to intervene strongly in the mediation proceedings
and in a way that may be detrimental to Ms. Doe's case. Bearing that in mind, if
Ms. Doe chose to use mediation, she would likely prefer the informal people's
mediation committee, rather than mediation conducted by the people's court.
This form of mediation may lead to a more socially peaceful and acceptable
result than what she could achieve through the people's courts.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. WEl Luo, supra note 234, at 15.
347. Id. at 17.
348. Id. at 15.
349. Id. at 15-16.
350. Id. at 16.
351. Id. at 16.
352. Woo & Wang, supra note 299, at 936-37.
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VI. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS
Given all that has been said it is unclear which of the three national systems
Jane Doe would necessarily prefer. Since her claim could not be decided in small
claims court, she is left only with the formal systems, an ADR system, or to
simply abandon the claim altogether.
Her first hurdle, in every system, is the simple fact of finding and securing an
attorney. In the United States she likely could find an attorney without any great
difficulty, but being able to afford one may prove problematic. She may be able
to rely on legal aid or pro bono services to fill in this gap, but it is far from
certain. In contrast, in France she would not only be able to secure an attorney
relatively easily, but could also take advantage of the expansive legal aid system.
Ms. Doe could also take advantage of the Chinese legal aid system; yet, even if
she did she may have great difficulty locating an attorney if she lives in one of
the rural areas of China.
Once Ms. Doe finds an attorney, or decides to proceed pro se, she has to
prepare her case and present it to the courts. Ever since the passing of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, pleading requirements in the United States have been
relatively lax, and would not present any great difficulty. In contrast, in France
she would have to surmount a significantly higher pleading standard. It would
not be sufficient for her to merely state a claim; instead, she would have to make
sure that she had a clear legal theory and knowledge of the facts, which may be
difficult for her at this point in the lawsuit. However, if Ms. Doe is able to qualify
for the commercial court, or perhaps the TI court, the flexibility and liberality of
those courts may lessen this burden. Lastly, if her claim came before a Chinese
court, Ms. Doe would, in addition to having to state the facts and legal theory she
is using, have to locate evidence to attach to her claim. This standard does not
appear to be extremely burdensome, but it is still far more than she would have to
provide to initiate an action in the United States.
Even if Ms. Doe is able to enter the formal justice system in the countries
mentioned, she may prefer to take advantage of the multiple forms of ADR that
may be available. In the United States she may prefer mediation or arbitration
depending on the nature of her dispute. If she believes there is a possibility of
compromise with the other party, mediation may be the best choice to resolve the
dispute amicably. However, if that is not possible or practical, she may opt for
arbitration as a quick and easy method of resolving her dispute in a way that is
generally binding. Yet, she may also decide not to use either method since
neither is necessarily going to be cheaper, or even more efficient than, the formal
justice system. More importantly, Ms. Doe may feel, like many Americans, that
it is important to have her day in court, and not opt for these procedures.
Both arbitration and mediation (or conciliation) would function similarly in
France, and Ms. Doe's motives to choose one or the other would likely be the
same. If Ms. Doe ended up in a TI court, she would likely have to use some form
of conciliation. However, the fact that arbitration awards are more easily subject
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to appeal in France may discourage Ms. Doe from using that method at all.
Out of the three countries, China appears to have the most well established
and systematic system of mediation. This is especially true if it is conducted
through informal, rather than judicial, means. Moreover, given the issues of
corruption and the importance mediation holds in Chinese culture, Ms. Doe may
greatly prefer this method over the formal courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The cultural and historical background of a country frames the debate about
what place procedural law has in the justice system, and how to balance the need
for fair procedure against the practical constraints of efficiency and cost. Not
surprisingly then, each country mentioned in this comment took very different
approaches on how to achieve that balance. In the United States, the justice
system is constructed to be fair and equitable, and to have a pleading standard
that is flexible enough to allow access to it. Yet, at the same time, this has led to
very high costs in litigation. In responding to this problem, the United States has
invested very little resources in legal aid; instead, it has chosen to rely heavily
upon contingency fees and pro bono services to give plaintiffs access to the
courts. At the same time, the court system responded to the growth in litigation
by trying to lighten their load through devices like mediation and arbitration.
France responded to the same problem by creating multiple types of courts
that vary in both the formality of the procedural rules, and overall purpose.
Although this system was designed to be flexible and allow ready access to the
courts, it is certainly more rigid, at least in the pleading stage, than in the United
States. For those who could not afford this system, France has provided a fairly
extensive legal aid program. At the same time, France, like the United States, has
tried to lighten the case load of courts via ADR devices like conciliation and
arbitration.
Lastly, China has a cultural history of preferring informal methods, such as
mediation and other ADR methods, rather than formal methods of dispute
resolution. Despite the importance of informal methods in Chinese culture, law
reformers have recently placed great emphasis on creating a formal legal
system,"' including introducing a national legal aid program. This development
is interesting because while France and the United States are increasingly
recognizing the importance of informal legal devices, China is moving in the
opposite direction by emphasizing a formal legal system."
Ms. Doe's journey through the three systems mentioned is intended to
provide the reader with multiple perspectives on how procedural laws develop,
and the very real and practical effect they can have. By showing this journey
353. See Colatrella, supra note 4, at 414-15.
354. Id.
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throughout multiple systems, the reader has an opportunity to not only
understand how different countries approach this issue, but also to appreciate the
tradeoffs that the pursuit of certain priorities entails. I have avoided making any
relative judgments about the three systems because the focus of this comment is
not which system is better. Instead, by demonstrating the effect procedural law
has on a person, even an imaginary one, this comment has demonstrated the
practical consequences of procedures, and how those procedures can facilitate or
interfere with substantive justice.
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